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The salient characteristics of emerging market economies coupled with the increasing 
adoption of inflation targeting in these countries has stimulated much debate about the 
role of the exchange rate in inflation targeting regimes. The paper aims at shedding more 
light on this issue by investigating whether central bank foreign exchange interventions 
have had any impact on the volatility of the exchange rate in Mexico and Turkey since 
the adoption of the floating regime.  To this end, the study, using daily data on foreign 
exchange intervention, employs an Exponential GARCH framework.  Empirical results 
suggest that both the amount and frequency of foreign exchange interventions have 
decreased the volatility of the exchange rates in these countries.  The findings corroborate 
the notion that if foreign exchange interventions are carried out with finesse and 
sensibly—i.e., not to defend a particular exchange rate—they could play a useful role 
under an inflation targeting framework in containing the adverse effects of temporary 
exchange rate shocks on inflation and financial stability. 
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The successful performance of a number of industrial countries that adopted 
inflation targeting (IT) has rendered this monetary policy framework an attractive 
alternative for emerging market economies (EMs).  Indeed, a number of EMs have 
already instituted IT or some form of this monetary policy framework. The increasing 
attraction of inflation targeting among EMs as a monetary policy framework combined 
with the salient characteristics of EMs has, in turn, stimulated much discussion about the 
role of the exchange rate in inflation targeting regimes.   
More specifically, it is argued that emerging market economies are often beset by 
a lack of credibility and limited access to international markets; they are beset by more 
pronounced adverse effects of exchange rate volatility on trade, high liability 
dollarization, and higher pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation.
1  
Consequently, it is argued that benign neglect of the exchange rate is not a feasible option 
for emerging market economies.   
This, in turn, begs the following question: How should policymakers take account 
of the exchange rate under IT?  It is true that under IT the credibility of the regime entails 
an institutional commitment to price stability since under this regime other goals—
including the exchange rate—are subordinated to price stability.  Monetary authorities in 
EMs, however, may need to take exchange rate movements into consideration for at least 
two reasons.  First, the evolution of the exchange rate has an important impact on 
inflation owing to the open nature of EMs.  Second, the presence of a thin foreign 
                                                 
1 Calvo (1999).   3
exchange market or temporary shocks in EMs often forces these countries to dampen 
short-term exchange rate volatility.  
As a consequence, EMs often resort to intervening or adjusting interest rates to 
contain the effect of temporary exchange rate shocks on inflation and financial stability.
2  
In practice, it appears that all inflation targeting central banks explicitly allow for the 
option of intervening in foreign exchange markets, although industrial countries have 
rarely relied on this option in recent years (see Appendix).  Indeed, evidence suggests that 
EMs, which typically have thinly-traded securities, engaged in foreign exchange 
interventions more frequently compared to industrial countries since the former are more 
vulnerable to disturbances stemming from the foreign exchange market (Carere et al., 
2002).   
Responding too heavily and too frequently to movements in the exchange rate 
under IT, however, runs the risk of transforming the exchange rate into a nominal anchor 
for monetary policy that takes precedence over the inflation target.   One possible way to 
avoid this problem for inflation targeting central banks in EMs is to adopt transparent 
mechanisms that would ensure that polices to influence the exchange rate are aimed at 
smoothing the impact of temporary shocks and achieving the inflation objective.   
Granted that central banks adopt such mechanisms, can they really mitigate 
unwarranted short-run exchange rate fluctuations?  In the context of the IT framework, 
this study aims to shed more light on this issue by considering the experiences of Mexico 
and Turkey under the floating regime. To this end, the paper attempts to model central 
bank intervention and its effect on volatility using autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity models. In particular, the study employs Nelson’s (1991) Exponential-
                                                 
2 See Goldstein (2001) and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) for more on this.   4
GARCH model, which allows for the inclusion of negative values as exogenous shocks in 
the variance, with a view to study the impact of sale and purchase operations separately 
in the analysis.    
The empirical findings suggest that both the amount and frequency of foreign 
exchange interventions have decreased the volatility of the exchange rates in the 
countries under consideration.  The results imply that sale operations are effective in 
influencing the exchange rate and its volatility, while purchase operations are found to be 
statistically insignificant in affecting the exchange rate and its volatility.  All in all, the 
findings lend support to the notion that if foreign exchange interventions are carried out 
with finesse and sensibly—i.e., not to defend a particular exchange rate—they could play 
a useful role under an IT framework in mitigating the adverse effects of temporary 
exchange rate shocks on inflation and financial stability. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides a 
brief overview of the literature on central bank intervention.  Section 3 discusses the key 
aspects of the intervention mechanisms in Mexico and Turkey under the floating 
exchange rate regime. Section 4 describes the empirical framework to model conditional 
volatility and the effect of central bank interventions. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results.  Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. A Brief Review of the Literature on Central Bank Intervention  
This section briefly reviews the literature on central bank intervention.  Empirical 
studies and statements by central banks suggest that central banks intervene in foreign 
exchange markets to slow or correct excessive trends in the exchange rate, i.e. they “lean   5
against the wind,” and to calm disorderly markets (Lewis 1995; Baille and Osterberg 
1997).  The channels through which a non-sterilized intervention in the foreign market 
may affect the exchange rate are well known in the economic literature.
3  A purchase of 
dollars from the Central Bank may depreciate the underlying currency in the same 
proportion as the increase in liquidity on the money market and vice versa. 
Sterilized intervention, on the other hand, might affect the exchange rate not 
through changes in liquidity, but through two main channels: portfolio balance and 
signaling.  The portfolio balance channel assumes that investors diversify based on mean 
variance analysis.
4 As long as foreign and domestic bonds are imperfect substitutes, 
sterilized interventions, which alter the relative supply of local bonds, will always induce 
a change in the composition of the investor’s portfolio. Investors will then require a 
greater (lower) return—measured by a risk premium—to absorb the increased (lower) 
supply of such instruments and this, along with an equal-amount-of-increase in the 
demand for foreign bonds, will cause a depreciation (appreciation) of the exchange rate. 
Since interventions are small relative to the stock of outstanding bonds, most 
authors, including Rogoff (1984), have expressed skepticism that interventions could 
have a large impact through the portfolio balance channel.  Not surprisingly, many 
studies do not find evidence of this channel and those that do, such as Evans and Lyons 
(2001) and Ghosh (1992), suggest it is weak.   
The signaling channel refers to the signals sent by the central bank to the market.  
More specifically, if the central bank uses foreign exchange interventions credibly to 
                                                 
3 For a more thorough review of the literature see Sarno and Taylor (2001), Dominguez and Frankel 
(1993b), and Edison (1993). 
4 A detailed analysis and description of the portfolio effect can be found in Domínguez and Frenkel 
(1993a).    6
indicate intended changes in monetary policy, the resulting appreciation of the exchange 
rate can be described as the signaling channel.   The policy intentions or beliefs of the 
authority with respect to the foreign exchange market are made explicit with the aim of 
stabilizing or re-directing the market. Even in the case where such intentions are never 
realized, the exchange rate may change as a result of changing expectations about 
fundamentals. 
  The impact of intervention through the signaling channel has often been found to 
be substantially stronger than through the portfolio balance channel (Dominguez and 
Frankel (1993a)).  For the signaling channel to be an ongoing transmission mechanism, 
central banks should be seen to follow interventions with appropriate changes in 
monetary policy.  Consequently, interventions operating through the signaling channel do 
not constitute an independent policy tool.
5 
 
3. A Quick Glance at the Key Aspects of Foreign Exchange Intervention Policies in 
Mexico and Turkey 
 
3.1 The Central Bank of Mexico  
In the face of balance of payments and financial crisis, the Central Bank of 
Mexico could no longer defend the predetermined parity and decided to float the peso on 
December 19, 1994.  With the adoption of the floating regime, the management of 
monetary aggregates became the anchor for the evolution of the general price level by 
early 1995.  During the first half of 1995, however, the authorities modified this ruled- 
                                                 
5 A recent study on Mexico, which aimed at investigating the portfolio and signaling effect, indicated that 
dollar purchases through the options mechanism have not significantly affected the foreign exchange 
market (Werner (1997b)).   7
based strategy centered solely on quantitative targets by incorporating discretion (via 
influencing the level of interest rates) in the conduct of monetary policy.  Under the new 
strategy, discretion was constrained by the following ultimate goal: the attainment of the 
annual inflation objective, and in the medium to long run, the gradual reduction of 
inflation.  This framework was maintained until 1997 and thereafter the monetary policy 
framework began a gradual transition toward an explicit, full-fledged, inflation targeting 
regime.  As a consequence, the monetary base became less relevant and the inflation 
target more significant in the implementation of monetary policy.  The Central Bank 
announced a series of annual inflation targets in 1999 with a view to converge to the 
inflation rate prevailing in the country’s main trading partners.  From this year on, the 
actual annual rate of inflation has been below the ceilings and the Central Bank expects 
to attain its final goal of a stationary annual inflation target of 3 percent by 2003.
 6 
Although it is no longer the anchor of the economy, the role of the exchange rate 
as an adjustment variable in the conduct of the monetary policy still remains crucial. The 
intensity of pass-through shocks on inflation and output levels (and volatility) hinge on 
the relative stability of the exchange rate, which, by and large, lies behind the policies of 
sterilized foreign exchange rate intervention. Such stabilization has presumably relied 
more on the effectiveness of U.S. dollar (USD)  sales in the foreign exchange market than 
to USD purchases, which have been mainly utilized to increase the amount of 
international assets. 
                                                 
6 See Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002) for more on this.   8
In August 1996, the authorities decided to auction put options
7 on the last 
business day of each month, giving the right to credit institutions of selling dollars to the 
Central Bank of Mexico on any day during the life of the contract as long as the exercise 
price (determined a day earlier) is no greater than the 20 day moving average of the fix 
exchange rate.
8 
Figure 1 presents the cumulative net purchases of USD since August 1996. By the 
end of the Put Options program in June 2001, international reserves represented  30% of 
the 40,866 million dollars. In total, market conditions allowed the participants to exercise 
the derivative instruments 132 times. Although there is no a clear policy of international 
reserve holdings, from the authorities’ standpoint, this amount of foreign currency seems 
to be sufficient to insure the floating of the peso against capital flight or sudden shocks to 
the capital account. 
Figure 1. Banco de Mexico’s cumulative purchases of dollars
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The discontinuation of the Options Program may be attributed to the increasing 
concerns related to balance sheet currency mismatches.  The bank assets returns (priced 
                                                 
7 This section provides a brief description of the derivatives mechanism.  A more comprehensive discussion 
of this issue can be found in Werner and Milo (1998). 
8  The fix exchange rate is the exchange rate used by credit institutions in Mexico to settle transactions 
denominated in foreign currency and to be liquidated within the country.    9
in dollars) have been lower with respect to the interest paid for government instruments 
denominated in local currency—a situation that worsens in episodes of excess demand 
for pesos. In addition, there could be funding risks associated to the different maturity 
dates of both assets and liabilities. 
In addition to keeping some symmetry in the intervention policy, internal and 
external destabilizing shocks have been controlled by daily auction sales of US$ 200 
million in a formal program of contingent sales of dollars since February 1997.
9  Figure 2 
shows the magnitude and frequency of the USD sales and purchases in millions with the 
auction amounts denoted by the lines. It is interesting to note that the amount of sales 
during the period under investigation, with 14 interventions by the Central Bank of 
Mexico, reached only USD 2,100 million.  
All in all, the main goal of the Put Options program has been the accumulation of 
international reserves, whereas contingent sales of dollars have been activated in periods 
of high volatility and liquidity contractions.
10  The authorities have made it clear that both 
Put Options and contingent sales are not intended to affect or defend a particular 
exchange rate. 
 
3.2 The Central Bank of Turkey  
On February 22, 2001, Turkey announced its intention to float the lira, after 
following a quasi-currency board/crawling peg exchange rate regime for over a year, as 
part of its economic reform program.  During the peak period of the crisis—the first 
                                                 
9 Before this program, during the crisis of 1995, an additional USD5 billion were sold to compensate the 
amortization of TESOBONOS and some commercial bank’s credit lines (Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner 
(2002)). 
10 However, the Annual Report for 1998 acknowledges that contingent sales may in fact worsen volatility 
during liquidity contractions (see page 130).   10
phase of forex operations—the priority of the Central Bank was to ensure the integrity of 
the payment system and keep potential systemic risks under control.  Foreign exchange 
sales were conducted with a view to assist the banking system to cover its foreign 
exchange short position and to enable banks to pay their foreign currency-based 
liabilities. Timing, total volume and value of sales were decided in accordance with 
market fluctuations, payment default risks and the daily sentiment of the market players. 
Other than direct sales, foreign exchange swaps have also been utilized under appropriate 
conditions.  
A new IMF supported economic program, which was launched in May 2001, 
marked the third phase of forex operations.  Under this program, pre-announcements of 
auctions were paused; and instead of daily base operations, sales have been decided 
according to daily market conditions. Additionally, it was decided that the total sale 
amount would not be announced before the auction and the final decision was given in 
accordance with total demand and daily market movements.  
The excess Turkish lira liquidity in the market, which was injected as a result of 
the utilization of the IMF and World Bank credits for Turkish lira payments by the 
Treasury, was mopped up by the programmed and scheduled foreign exchange sale 
auctions. Contrary to earlier phases during which the aim was to support the banking 
system, in this phase the Central Bank used forex operations as part of liquidity 
management policies. 
During July 2001, pre-announced auction figures remained within the minimum 
levels, so that the Central Bank had the option to increase the amount to be sold if the 
need were to emerge. Moreover, instead of one auction per day, auctions were placed on   11
certain dates, with around two auctions per week.  Daily auctions were put back in place 
in September 2001 with a daily sale amount of USD 20 million and were continued 
through November.  However, these pre-announced auctions were paused in December 
2001, as the Treasury did not plan to use additional external funding for the purpose of 
domestic payments. 
The fourth phase of forex operations was determined by the Central Bank’s 
decision to increase the level of foreign exchange reserves through foreign exchange 
buying auctions. However, as was the case with the pre-announced and pre-scheduled 
auctions, there was no targeted level of reserves to be achieved. The aim was to enhance 
the level of foreign exchange reserves without creating additional volatility in the foreign 
exchange rates and without disturbing the banks’ foreign exchange positions.   
The Central Bank resumed holding daily foreign exchange buying auctions in the 
amount of USD 20 million during June 2002 as well. During this month, 20 foreign 
exchange buying auctions were scheduled, so that the maximum amount of foreign 
exchange to be bought through these auctions would not exceed USD 400 million.   
However, the Central Bank decided to suspend the foreign exchange buying auctions 
temporarily from July 1, 2002, in view of the reduced volume of the transactions and 
increased political uncertainty prior to early elections in November 2002. 
 
4. Modeling Volatility and Central Bank Intervention 
A recent wave of studies on the effects of central bank intervention on the 
volatility of the exchange rate has relied on the stylized Generalized Autoregressive   12
Conditional Heterosledasitcity (GARCH) models.
11  For instance, to analyze the effect of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Central Bank of Japan on the volatility of the mark and 
the yen respectively, Dominguez (1998) uses the parsimonious GARCH(1,1) model of 
Bollerslev (1986).  In an attempt to avoid violating non-negativity conditions, 
Dominguez (1998) includes the absolute value of sales and purchases as exogenous 
variables in the variance equation.  This transformation, however, does not allow the 
investigation to distinguish the effect of sales (expressed in negative magnitudes) on the 
conditional variance adequately. Instead, the study focuses on the overall effect of 
intervention. 
Recent studies for the above-mentioned currencies suggest that traditional 
GARCH models are outperformed by fractionally integrated or long-memory processes 
and tend to underestimate the intervention effects in terms of volatility.
12  In their study 
on the Bank of Australia’s intervention operations and its effect on exchange rate 
volatility, Kim, et. al. (2000) employ the Exponential-GARCH (E-GARCH) model of 
Nelson (1991). The E-GARCH allows for the inclusion of negative variables affecting 
volatility, which, in turn, makes it possible to analyze the components of the intervention 
operations—i.e., sales and purchases as well.   
In this paper, we also follow this approach to analyze both the overall effect of 
intervention and the individual effect of sales and purchases.  More specifically, we 
                                                 
11 In the case of Mexico an alternative approach would consist in analyzing the implied volatility of option 
prices. The main practical limitation, however, is the lack of information on a daily basis. 
12 See for instance (Beine, et. al. (2002)).   13
propose the following process to model exchange rate returns and conditional volatility 
assuming that the error terms are drawn from a double exponential (DE) distribution:
13 
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where INTER, SALES, PURCHS stand for, all in millions of USD, central bank 
intervention, sales of foreign exchange, and purchases of foreign exchange, 
respectively.
14 
SIGN is a dummy variable with a value of unity on the day of a public report, and 
is intended to signal exchange rate policy intentions on dates where there was a 
modification of the contractual terms of the auctions. Information on this variable is 
recorded from the central banks monetary reports, annual reports and press releases. 
In an attempt to directly account for the effect of intervention in the money 
market, we include the policy instrument for each country, denoted as ON.  For Mexico, 
we use the actual daily stance or target for cumulative balances in millions of pesos, 
                                                 
13 A preliminary analysis suggested the use of the Generalized Error Distribution (GED). The estimated tail 
thickness parameter (ν) could not reject the hypothesis Ho: ν= 1, which corresponds to the Laplace 
distribution whose distribution function is  2 / | | ) ( x e x f − = . In addition, Akaike and Bayes criteria 
preferred this conditional density over a GED, normal or t distributions. This analysis is not included in the 
paper, although the results are readily available upon request. 
14 In the case of Mexico, given that investors will decide to exercise the put options in appreciating trends, 
Werner (1997b) noticed that the variable PURCHS cannot be an exogenous variable since it is correlated 
with the error term (εt) in equation (1).  In order to address the inconsistency problem, he uses the two 
period lag of the variable as instrumental variable. In this paper, we also follow this approach (see Werner 
(1997b) for more details).   14
whereas for Turkey the annualized first difference of the overnight interest rate is 
employed.  
Werner (1997b) has reported a very strong association between the international 
price for debt and the exchange rate process in Mexico. In light of his finding, we include 
the first difference of the Brady bond yields, denoted as BRADY.  
To examine the effects of central bank intervention in frequency terms, that is, to 
study the response of the variance to the number of times the institution sells or buys at 
the same time, we include dummy variables taking a value of one for every purchase and 
minus one for every sale of dollars in the market, and zero in the case of no sales or 
purchases.  In other words, INTER takes a value of unity when net purchases of dollars 
(the sum of buys and sells) are positive, minus one when they are negative, and 0 
otherwise. PURCHS will take a value of one when there is a purchase of dollars and zero 
otherwise, while SALES takes a value of minus one for every sale of dollars. 
The parameter α in the variance equation emulates the clustering effect showed 
by traditional GARCH models, whereas γ is a leverage parameter allowing the variance 
to respond differently following equal magnitude negative or positive shocks. Volatility 
persistence is measured by β under the restriction that the estimate is smaller than one to 
avoid an explosive behavior of the variance. 
To examine the asymmetric response of the variance to positive and negative 
innovations, we employ the News Impact Curve (NIC) by Engle and Ng (1993), which is 
defined as: 
   15
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Finally, to account for day of the week effects, we tested the significance of 




5. Data Description and Estimation Results 
5.1 Data Analysis
16 
Daily exchange rate returns are calculated by taking the log difference of the US 
dollar/ Mexican peso ($US/MXP) exchange rate from August 1, 1996 to June 29, 2001 
and of the US dollar/Turkish lira ($US/TL) from February 22, 2001 to May 30, 2002, 
respectively. For Mexico, we use the exchange rate determined in the 48 hour inter-bank 
foreign exchange market.
17 In the case of Turkey, we employ the selling spot rate. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the exchange rate log returns, the first 
difference of the Brady bond yields in Mexico, the target for cumulative balances (or 
short) in millions of pesos, and the first difference of the overnight interest rate in 
Turkey.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on exchange rate log-returns and money market. 
                                                 
15 We do not report such estimators on the grounds of parsimony, though the results can be obtained from 
the authors upon request. 
16 All data are obtained from the Banco de Mexico and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey except 
for Brady par yield, which is taken from Datastream (mnemonics MXBSYLD). 
17 We also used the spot floating exchange rate and the results are basically equivalent.   16
  x   σ  S
a K
b SW
c Min. Max. N 
US$/MXP -0.0061
 d 0.0026  -1.6018  19.43 0.8285
* -0.0243 0.0155  1,282 
US$/TL -0.0969
d 0.0119  5.6253  67.41 0.6564
* -0.1454 0.0546  317 
BRADY
e -0.0033  0.3229  -0.1581  17.16  0.7933
* -3.0400 2.3700  1,282 
ON
f -12.525  164.31  16.0202  267.88  0.0802
* -2,823.3 4.0000  317 
Short
g -130.40  128.00  -0.6873  -0.6063  0.8362
* -400  0  1,282 
*Reject the null at the 1% level. 
a S=Skewness; 
b K=Kurtosis; 
c SW= Shapiro-Wilk test for normality; 
d Numbers multiplied by 100; 
e 
BRADY  is the first difference of the Mexican brady bond; 
f ON is the first difference of the overnight Turkish interest rate and 
gShort 
is the Target for Cumulative Balances in Mexico in millions of Pesos. 
Log-returns present excess kurtosis and significant departures from normality as 
indicated by the Shapiro-Wilk test. The distribution of the Turkish lira is biased to the 
right, and the peso to the left.  
 
Figure 3: US$/MXP exchange rate
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Figure 5: US$/TL exchange rate
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a: August 1996–June 2001, contingent sales in vertical lines; b: 22 February 2001– 29 May 2002. 
   17
Table 2 presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
tests for unit roots.  The findings of both tests show that log-returns of the peso and lira 
can be treated as stationary variables. 
 
Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron (PP) unit root tests
 a 
 ADF    PP 











* Significant at the 1% level. 
a The order of augmentation is in parenthesis and the tests include a drift term.  
 
Table 3 displays statistics on the Central Bank of Mexico daily foreign exchange 
market intervention. The average amount of put options at auction was USD 235.8 
million. To put this into context, it is comparable to the mean sales or purchases of 
dollars carried out by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank during the period 1977 to 1994. The 
average amount of exercised options was, however, USD 9.6 million. 
The amount and frequency of contingent sales is substantially smaller than that of 
purchases. There was a sale of dollars every 100 working days of about USD 1.7 million 
on average. The maximum amount of USD sales is 200 million, which took place on 
September 10, 1998, and is almost equivalent to the highest amount of exercised options. 
On that day, there was also a USD 278 million discretionary and unanticipated sale of 
dollars. 
 
Table 3. Statistics of foreign exchange daily intervention in Mexico, August 1996-
June 2001. 
  Average Amount (m.d.)  Dispersion (m.d.)  Max. (m.d.) 
 
Put Options  235.8  97.10  500 
Exercised Options  9.6  37.03  279 
Sales 1.7 17.36  200 
   18
The dotted lines in Figure 3 with the $US/MXP spot exchange rate and Figure 4 
with log exchange rate returns from August 1996 to June 2001 show the points at which 
there were contingent sales of dollars, which mainly occurred during high volatility 
periods and seemed to be followed by currency appreciations.  
In general, one may say that the magnitude and frequency of interventions in 
Mexico, which declined noticeably since 1999, are in line with the experience of other 
countries that practice floating with varying degrees of “dirt”.
18   
 
5.2 Estimation Results 
This section aims to assess whether central bank interventions both in frequency 
and magnitude have any impact on the evolution of the exchange rate and its volatility.  
To this end, Tables 4 and 5 report the empirical results pertaining to the overall and 
individual central bank intervention effects on the conditional mean and variance.
19,20 The 
first two columns corresponding to each country present the E-GARCH parameter 
estimates with exogenous shocks measured in magnitudes and frequencies, respectively. 
The column labeled restricted in Table 5 for each country shows the basic model with no 
intervention effects, that is φinter=φpurch=φsales=φsign=φbrady=φon=φput=0 in both the mean and 
variance equations. 
Diagnostics and decision criteria are presented at the bottom of the tables. Akaike 
and Bayes criteria select a parsimonious random walk plus drift to model the mean 
                                                 
18 In the real world clean floats do not exist.  Even the US, usually regarded as the cleanest of the floaters, 
intervenes occasionally in the foreign exchange market.  In the case of Mexico, the majority of sale 
interventions were associated with the pressures exerted by the Zamba and Russian crises during 1998. 
19 The overall effect of interventions is studied by setting φpurch=φsales=0 in equation (1). The individual 
impacts are analyzed by constraining φinter=0 in the same equation. 
20 The lag structure in the estimations is determined by the Bayesian and Akaike information criteria.   19
exchange rate returns of both currencies.
21 Ljung-Box statistics for the presence of 
autocorrelation in the standardized residuals and in the squares of the standardized 
residuals cannot reject the null at conventional levels.
22  
 
5.2.1 Mean Equation 
We first examine the exchange rate mean level. According to our estimates, 
overall intervention operations during the floating regime have had a highly significant 
positive impact on the exchange rates, as can be seen from φinter in Table 4.  A net sale of 
USD 100 million in Mexico appreciates the exchange rate by 0.08 percent, whereas in 
Turkey a similar operation appreciates the lira by 0.20 percent.  
As can be seen from Table 4, the results show that both the size and the frequency 
of central bank interventions in the market exert a positive pressure on the foreign 
exchange—i.e. appreciation.  More specifically, our findings imply that whenever the 
exchange market perceives the presence of the central bank, the Mexican peso and the 






                                                 
21 In the case of Mexico, this is in line with Werner (1997a) and Werner (1997b). The difference of local 
and foreign interest rates was also considered as a regressor; however, this variable became statistically 
insignificant in both countries once departures from normality are taken into account. 
22 The exception is net intervention measured in frequencies for Turkey presented in Table 5 where the 
introduction of qualitative dummies somehow induces heteroskedasticity. To deal with potential model 
misspecification we calculated robust t-ratios using the Quasi Maximum Likelihood method suggested by 
Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). The results, available from the authors, are consistent with the original 
findings and basically confirm the conclusions.    20
 
 
Table 4. EGARCH(1,1) Estimations: Net Foreign Exchange Central Bank 
Intervention in Mexico and Turkey. 
 Mexico    Turkey 
 Magnitudes
a Frequencies Restricted   Magnitudes
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δput  -0.00008 
(-0.55512) 
_ _    _ _  _ 
Decision Criteria 
AIC
e -12,582.7  -12,625.5  -12,491.1   -2,317.6  -2,309.8  -2,277.3 
BIC
e  -12,505.4 -12,553.4  -12,460.1    -2,280.0 -2,272.2  -2,262.3 
Qε(20)




























*, ** and *** denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
a In millions of US dollars; 
b t-ratios in parenthesis; 
c Net 
intervention is measured as the sum of sales and purchases in a given day; 
d ON denotes the target for cumulative balances (short) in 
Mexico and the overnight interest rate in Turkey; 




ε(20) are the twentieth-order Ljung-Box tests for correlation in the standardized residuals and in the squares of the standardized 
residuals; 
g P-values in brackets. 
 
In Table 5, we present the effect of intervention on the exchange rate by type of 
operations. A sale to the market of USD 100 million appreciates the peso by 0.90 percent, 
while an equivalent intervention in Turkey appreciates the lira by 0.20 percent.   
Similarly, for every presence of the central banks, the peso and the lira appreciate by 1.3   21
percent and 0.16 percent, respectively.  By contrast, purchases of dollars are generally not 
statistically different from zero, suggesting that sterilized interventions of this nature do 
not influence the exchange rate mean level. 
 
 
Table 5. EGARCH(1,1) Estimations: Central Bank dollar sales/purchases in 
amounts and frequencies.  
 Mexico    Turkey 
 Magnitudes
a Frequencies    Magnitudes
a Frequencies 
Mean Equation 








































































































































_   _  _ 
Decision Criteria 
AIC
d  -12,556.8 -12,578.2    -2,316.8  -2,310.6 
BIC
d  -12,474.3 -12,500.9    -2,275.5  -2,269.2 
Qε(20)




















*, ** and *** denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
a In millions of US dollars; 
b t-ratios in parenthesis; 
c ON 
denotes the target for cumulative balances (short) in Mexico and the overnight interest rate in Turkey;  
dAIC and BIC are the Akaike 
and Bayes Information Criteria respectively; 
e Q ε(20) and Q
2
ε(20) are the twentieth-order Ljung-Box tests for correlation in the 
residuals and in the squares of the residuals; 
f P-values in brackets. 
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The results also suggest that monetary policy instruments and signals to the 
market— estimates of φON and φsign—do not seem to affect the direction or magnitude of 
the mean exchange rate.
23  Finally, in line with the findings of Werner (1997b), an 
increase in the international price for debt is associated with the depreciation of the 
Mexican peso. 
 
5.2.2. Variance Equation 
We next turn to the effect of overall and disaggregated central bank intervention 
on the conditional variance. As indicated by Dominguez (1998), central bank intervention 
is expected to reduce volatility as long as it signals a commitment to reduce volatility and 
intervention is both credible and unambiguous. 
From the estimated parameters (δinter in Table 4), we observe that overall central 
bank intervention has significantly decreased the conditional variance of both the 
Mexican peso and the Turkish lira.  In this respect, it may be useful to make a distinction 
between the size and frequency of the interventions in terms of their impact on the 
volatility of the exchange rate.  The response of volatility to the magnitude of 
intervention is very similar in both countries. The impact of the frequency of intervention 
on the volatility of the exchange rate, however, is greater in the case of Mexico compared 
to Turkey.  
When the impact of interventions is studied separately, the results, once again, 
show that the reduction of volatility is a direct result of sales and not purchases of dollars 
(Table 5). Indeed, the findings demonstrate that dollar sales—both in size and 
                                                 
23 The φON estimates are not reported in Table 5 to save space.   23
frequency—have a strong negative impact on the volatility of the exchange rate, while 
the impact of purchases on the volatility of the exchange rate turns out to be positive but 
statistically insignificant.
24,25 
In line with the findings of Kim, et. al. (2000), exchange rate volatility in Mexico 
has been at best weakly positively influenced by the signaling effect (δsign in Table 4). 
The results suggest that official reports, signaling modifications in the policy of 
intervention, have not had a significant effect on the conditional variance of the Turkish 
lira.   
The empirical results also imply that changes in the monetary authorities’ 
instrument have an impact on the conditional variance process.  As can be seen from 
Table 5, changes in the policy instrument—short—have a positive impact on the 
volatility of the exchange rate (δON) in Mexico.   
In the case of Turkey, however, the results imply that an increase in the policy 
instrument—overnight interest rate—has a negative effect on the conditional variance of 
the exchange rate.
26  The negative impact exerted by the monetary policy instrument in 
Turkey suggests that interest rate intervention is possibly acting as a parallel stabilizing 
force, while in the case of Mexico empirical findings suggest that the target for 
cumulative balances has an adverse impact on the stability of the exchange rate market.  
                                                 
24 There is, however, some weak evidence suggesting that the volatility of the peso increases with the 
magnitude of the purchase by 15 basis points (see δpurchs in Table 5).  
25 These results are in clear contrast with the studies on hard currencies by Beine et. al (2002), Kim, et. al. 
(2000), Baillie & Oesterber (1997a,b) and Dominguez (1998), who find that exchange rate volatility is 
generally increased following a central bank intervention. 
26 Contrary to our findings for Turkey, Booth, et. al. (2000) report a positive association between interest 
rate changes and exchange rate volatility in their study of the effects of the Bundesbank’s discount and 
Lombard’s interest rate changes on the volatility of the DM exchange rate.    24
Finally, in the case of Mexico, we also find weak evidence suggesting that the size of the 
put options contracts reduces the volatility of the peso. 
In the context of the floating regime, what can be concluded about the 
performance of forex interventions in these countries?  As argued by Obstfeld (1995), 
clean floating means high volatility of the nominal exchange rate—much higher than 
early proponents such as Friedman (1953) and Johnson (1969) anticipated.  Moreover, as 
Mussa (1986) points out, it almost always means greater volatility of the real exchange 
rate, for prices move sluggishly.  To the extent that this volatility in real prices is costly, 
either directly or because it causes volatility in output or in the health of the financial 
system, policy makers typically want to mitigate it.  This, in turn, could explain to a great 
extent the rationale for the intervention in the foreign exchange market in both countries.  
In this regard, results imply that central bank interventions both in Mexico and Turkey 
have been successful. 
 
5.2.3 Clusters, Asymmetries and Persistency 
As was discussed in section four, the conditional variance of the exchange rates 
might not only be affected by the magnitude of innovations and by past values of the 
conditional variance, as is the case in simple GARCH processes, but also by the direction 
of the shocks.  
As can be gathered from Tables 4 and 5, the E-GARCH parameters with no 
exception are highly significant. Once we consider intervention, the decay rate (β) for 
Turkey is higher than that of Mexico.  More specifically, a volatility shock to the peso’s 
conditional variance reaches half its original size in four days as a minimum, while it   25
takes three days at most in the case of the lira.
27 Interestingly, our estimates suggest that 
shocks to volatility are less persistent when the central bank intervenes. 
The conditional variance of the peso reacts differently to equal magnitude 
negative and positive innovations.
28  From the standpoint of the foreign investor, the 
response of the conditional variance would be greater to bad news (depreciations) than to 
good news (appreciations) of the same magnitude.  
To examine the effect of central bank intervention on the sensitivity of the 
conditional variance of both currencies, we use the news impact curve (NIC) for the 
restricted EGARCH model (continuous line) introduced in section four.
29  As can be seen 
from Figure 7, the conditional variance of the peso reacts more to past negative shocks 
than to positive innovations of equal size. Moreover, the response is greater, the bigger 
the size of the shock. For the Turkish lira, such response is fully symmetric since the 
leverage effect turned out to be statistically insignificant. 
The doted and discontinuous lines in Figure 7 also show the NIC for the extended 
models—i.e., considering intervention in frequencies and magnitudes respectively. They 
present the actual variance responses once the exogenous variables are taken into 
consideration. In general, the sensitivity of the conditional variance is greater than the 




                                                 
27 This is the so-called half-life statistic indicating the number of days in which a shock to the variance 
reaches half its initial size. Here we calculate this as log(0.5)/log(β). 
28 The leverage effect (γ) in Turkey was not significantly different from zero. Hence, in all the estimations 
for this country, we restrict such coefficient to zero in which case the responses of the conditional variance, 
as it is graphically shown, are fully symmetric. 
29 To keep comparability, we standardized all NIC curves by setting A=1. 
30 See also AIC and BIC in Tables 5 and 6.   26
Figure 7: News Impact Curve before and after foreign exchange intervention. 
 
The existence of asymmetries in Mexico is a direct result of the stylized fact 
where depreciations are not just usually followed by high volatility episodes, but also 
such shocks affect more the conditional variance compared to appreciations of equal 
magnitude. In the money market, Mendoza (2002) has related asymmetries to the 
behavior of the exchange rate: sudden exchange rate depreciations may cause the 
volatility of the interest rates term structure to be higher than it would be following 
unexpected appreciations of the same size.  
We believe that a similar reasoning lies behind the finding of asymmetries in the 
Mexican foreign exchange market. It is perhaps the exchange rate coordination with the   27
monetary policy that gives rise to different volatility responses. Sudden depreciations 
(bad news) would decrease the expected future holding returns of local investments, 
which, in turn, would increase the exchange rate volatility more than equal size 
appreciations (good news) given the investors’ desire to get rid of excess local holdings. 
 
6. Conclusion  
  The intrinsic problems of exchange rates in emerging market economies (EMs) 
coupled with the increasing adoption of inflation targeting (IT) in these countries has 
rendered the role of the exchange rate under an IT framework as one of the most 
frequently discussed topics in the relevant literature.  It is argued that monetary policy in 
EMs tends to be more sensitive to exchange rate movements both directly—because of 
pass-through effects on inflation—and indirectly—because the exchange rate appears as 
an additional argument in central bank objective functions, reflecting their concerns for 
devaluation-induced bank failures and domestic recessions.
31 
  As a result, central banks in EMs often resort to sterilized exchange rate 
interventions in response to large exchange rate shocks in order to contain the impact of 
pass-through effects on inflation and reduce excessive exchange rate volatility.  This 
study aims at shedding more light on this issue by investigating whether central bank 
foreign exchange interventions have had any impact on the volatility of the exchange rate 
in Mexico and Turkey since the adoption of the floating regime.  To this end, we employ 
an Exponential GARCH framework, which allows us to investigate both the overall 
effect of the intervention and the individual effect of sales and purchases. 
                                                 
31 Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002).   28
The results of the empirical investigation suggest that overall intervention 
operations during the floating regime in both countries has had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the exchange rates.  More specifically, empirical findings suggest 
that a net sale of USD 100 million appreciates the exchange rate in Mexico and Turkey 
by 0.08 percent by 0.20 percent, respectively.  The empirical evidence also shows that the 
presence of the central bank matters: whenever the exchange market perceives the 
presence of the central bank, the Mexican peso and the Turkish lira appreciate by 0.12 
percent and 0.09 percent, respectively. 
As far as the individual impact of central banks’ purchase and sale operations are 
concerned, the results suggest that a sale to the market of USD 100 million appreciates 
the peso by 0.90 percent, while an equivalent intervention in Turkey appreciates the lira 
by 0.20 percent.  Similarly, in the presence of the central bank, the peso and the lira 
appreciate by 1.3 percent and 0.16 percent, respectively.  By contrast, the results suggest 
that purchases of dollars are generally statistically insignificant, suggesting that sterilized 
interventions of this nature are not effective.   
The empirical findings concerning the impact of overall intervention on the 
volatility of the exchange rate suggest that overall central bank interventions have 
reduced the conditional variance of both the Mexican peso and the Turkish lira.
32   When 
the impact of interventions is studied separately, the results, once again, show that the 
reduction of volatility is a direct result of sale operations.  Purchase operations do not 
seem to have a statistically significant effect on the volatility of the exchange rate. 
                                                 
32 The results suggest that the response of volatility to the magnitude of intervention is very similar in both 
countries. The impact of the presence in the market on the volatility of the exchange rate, however, is 
greater in the case of Mexico compared to Turkey.    29
There are two main policy implications emerging from the thrust of the overall 
findings.  First, there seems to be scope for EMs to operate flexible exchange rate 
regimes without having to adopt a textbook type of pure float.  In fact, it would be 
unreasonable to assert that EMs should adopt more pure forms of floating than the 
industrial countries have been able to sustain, particularly when the conditions necessary 
for a successful float are less likely to be present in such economies. 
33  
Second, the fact that exchange rates, at times, move too far relative to 
fundamentals even in countries that pursue credible monetary and fiscal policy provides a 
legitimate role for intervention.  In order to ensure the desired impact on expectations and 
the behavior of market participants, interventions should be based on transparent 
mechanisms and should be used sparingly.     
There are obviously difficult practical issues regarding the operation of 
intervention.  The intuitive idea as put forth by Volcker (1995), however, is clear 
enough—the further the actual exchange rate has departed from the equilibrium, the more 
damage the misalignment will do; the more confident the authorities can be that they will 
be acting as profitable stabilizing speculators (buying low and selling high); and the 
greater likelihood of success of any intervention on the part of the authorities. 
The empirical findings and the above highlighted policy suggestions, which are 
based on the premise that intervention can be effective in smoothing short-term 
fluctuations in the exchange rate, do not suggest that policy intervention can be used to 
                                                 
33 Evidence from a recent research by Hunt et. al. (2002), which argues that benign neglect of the exchange 
rate is not necessarily the best approach in the conduct of monetary policy under IT—particularly if risk 
premia are subject to shocks that cause exchange rates to deviate persistently from levels consistent with 
macroeconomic fundamentals—seems to support this conjecture.  Larrain and Velasco (2002) also make a 
case in favor of this argument. 
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resolve underlying economic problems.  Obviously, such problems should be addressed 
by more fundamental policy measures.  Moreover, foreign interventions that oppose 
major market trends stand little chance of success; the old market wisdom, “don’t stand 
in front of a freight train,” is also valid for foreign exchange interventions. 
In conclusion, the results corroborate the notion that if foreign exchange 
interventions are carried out with finesse and sensibly—i.e., not to defend a particular 
exchange rate—they could play a useful role under an IT framework in containing the 
adverse effects of temporary exchange rate shocks on inflation and financial stability.   31
Appendix 
Inflation Targeting Country Central Banks 
Publicly Reported Information on Foreign Exchange Market Intervention Practices, 2001 
 




Australia    The Reserve Bank of Australia intervenes when the exchange rate is 
overshooting; and when market conditions are unsettled. 
IMF Country Report 01/162 
 
Canada    The Bank of Canada intervenes only in exceptional circumstances. 
        
Bank of Canada Annual Report, 2000               
Iceland          The Central Bank of Iceland intervenes only to adhere to inflation 
target or sees exchange rate fluctuations as a potential threat to 
financial stability.                                      
Monetary Bulletin of the Central Bank of 
Iceland,                                                               
November 2001                                     
New Zealand                   The Reserve Bank could intervene directly in the foreign exchange 
market to counteract “disorderly market conditions”; in practice the 
Reserve Bank has not intervened since 1985. 
Reserve Bank Governor speech, October 
2000 
                                        
 
Norway     The Central Bank of Norway intervenes when the currency moves 
significantly out of line with reasonable fundamentals and at the 
same time exchange rate developments impair the prospects of 
achieving the inflation target. Interventions may also be necessary in 
the event of large short-term fluctuations of the currency when 
foreign exchange market liquidity is reduced. 
 
Annual Report, 2001 
 
Sweden     The Riksbank intervened in the currency market in June 2001, for 
the first time in years, to limit the impact of a sudden depreciation on 
inflation. 
 




United Kingdom    
The Bank of England can intervene in the foreign exchange market.       Bank of England fact sheet on Foreign 
Exchange Market, Bank of England website     
 
Emerging Market Countries 
  
Brazil                  The  Central  Bank  of  Brazil  may  intervene  on  a  regular  basis,  to 
adhere to the inflation target, or in exceptional situations.                       
IMF Press Release No. 01/38, Sept. 2001 
and Central Bank of Brazil Annual Report, 
2000         
Chile             The  Central  Bank  of Chile has the authority to intervene in 
exceptional circumstances; these interventions must be publicly 
announced and justified. 
                                            
Central Bank of Chile Annual Report 2000 
 
Colombia      The Banco de la Republica does not intervene in the exchange 
market to define a particular exchange rate, although auctions of 
foreign currency sale options are used to accumulate international 
reserves.                                                                                         
Report to the Parliament, July 2001 
 
Czech Republic     Interventions only to moderate large fluctuations in the exchange 
rate.   
                  
IMF Country Report 01/112 
 
Hungary       The National Bank of Hungary intervenes to maintain the forint in a 
+/- 15 percent band.        
  
National Bank of Hungary website 
 
Israel            The Bank of Israel has not intervened since 1997, allowing market 
forces to determine the appropriate level of the exchange rate within 
the exchange rate band. (The width of the band against a basket of 
currencies is 39.2 percent.)                                       
Bank of Israel, Foreign Currency 
Department, 2000 Annual Report and IMF 
Country Report 01/133 
 
 
Korea  The Bank of Korea has intervened in the foreign exchange market in 
recent years. 
          
IMF Public Information Notice 01/8 
 
Mexico          The Banco de Mexico lets the peso float freely. 
                                                                
IMF Country Report 01/77 
 
Poland  A pure floating exchange rate regime has been in place since April 
2000.                       
IMF Country Report 01/56 
 
South Africa                              The Reserve Bank did not intervene in the foreign exchange market 
during 2000 except to buy foreign exchange to lower the net open 
foreign exchange position.             
IMF Public Information Notice 01/44 
 
Thailand     Direct foreign exchange intervention is limited. 
 
Bank of Thailand website   
 Turkey
a                                          The Central Bank of Turkey lets the lira float freely.                                IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Restrictions (2001)  
Source Carare et. al. (2002); a:Although Turkey has not adopted inflation targeting (IT) formally, official documents of 
the Central Bank describe the  current monetary policy framework as an implicit IT.   32
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